

National Security Council Files

1943 Middle East War, 29 October, 1943 — File No. 24

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
October 29, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *HS*
SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Major Jewish
Leaders on US Resupply to Israel

During the hostilities, Max Fisher, Chairman of the Board of the Governors of the Jewish Agency and other major figures in the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations went formally on record with a letter to the President urging US resupply for Israel. They applauded the President's past record of support for Israel as "steadfast." [Tab B]

Though they are fully informed of our efforts, the President may wish to go on record in reply. State has recommended the letters at Tab A for Max Fisher in his capacity and also for Jacob Stein as Chairman of the Conference. It is intended as a broad rather than specific statement of US support. [The letter to Stein also thanks for a thoughtful follow-up telegram he sent supporting the President's actions.]

RECOMMENDATION: That you seek the President's signatures on the letters at Tab A to Fisher and Stein via the attached memo.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Reply to American Jewish Leaders

During the early days of the Middle East war, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations -- including Jacob Stein as Chairman of its board and Max Fisher as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Jewish Agency, -- went formally on record by letter to you urging US resupply for Israel. They applauded your past record of support for Israel's existence as "steadfast." [Tab B]

Though they are fully informed of our efforts, you may wish to formally go on record with a reply which could be sent to both Messrs. Stein and Fisher. A proposed text is at Tab A. The suggested letter to Mr. Stein also incorporates your thanks for a thoughtful follow-up telegram he and many of his colleagues sent you supportive of your actions.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the letters to Max Fisher and Jacob Stein at Tab A. [Text coordinated with Mr. Gergen.]

5746

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Max:

You and your colleagues have my sincere thanks for your letter of October 9 concerning the tragic war in the Middle East. This Government remains unwavering in its support for the security and well-being of the State of Israel and you can be confident that we will take whatever steps are necessary to maintain that support.

As you know, we believe that a continuing military balance is vital for Israel and we are helping to maintain that balance through our military assistance efforts. We hope that the ceasefire will lead to genuine negotiations which can assure peace and security for Israel in the years to come.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

Mr. Max Fisher
2210 Fisher Building
Detroit, Michigan 48202

RN: State: HH Saunders: L Huebner: tmt 10/29/73

5740

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Stein:

I have wanted to thank you and your colleagues for your letter of October 9 concerning the tragic war in the Middle East as well as your thoughtful telegram of October 14. You can be sure that this Government remains committed to the security and well-being of the State of Israel and that we are taking whatever steps are necessary to continue that support. As you know, we are giving specific expression to the United States commitment through the military assistance efforts we have launched in past weeks to maintain the balance which is so vital to Israel. We hope that the ceasefire currently underway will give ground to genuine negotiations which can bring enduring peace and security for Israel.

With very best wishes to you and your colleagues,

Sincerely,

Mr. Jacob Stein
Chairman
Conference of Presidents of Major
American Jewish Organizations
515 Park Avenue
New York, New York, 10022

RN: STATE: H H Saunders: L H Hubner: tmt: 10/29/73

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

7028-12
515 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022
PLaza 2-1616
Cable Address: COJOGRA

AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS:

AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC
AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS

AMERICAN TRADE UNION
COUNCIL for HISTADRUT

AMERICAN ZIONIST FEDERATION

B'NAI B'RITH

BNAI ZION

CENTRAL CONFERENCE OF
AMERICAN RABBIS

COUNCIL OF JEWISH FEDERATIONS
and WELFARE FUNDS (observer)

HADASSAH

JEWISH LABOR COMMITTEE

JEWISH RECONSTRUCTIONIST
FOUNDATION

JEWISH WAR VETERANS
OF THE U.S.A.

LABOR ZIONIST MOVEMENT—
Poale Zion, Farband, Pioneer Women

MIZRACHI-HAPOEL HAMIZRACHI

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
JEWISH WOMEN

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
YOUNG ISRAEL

NATIONAL JEWISH COMMUNITY
RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL

NATIONAL JEWISH WELFARE BOARD

NORTH AMERICAN JEWISH
YOUTH COUNCIL

THE RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY

RABBINICAL COUNCIL OF AMERICA

UNION OF AMERICAN HEBREW
CONGREGATIONS

UNION OF ORTHODOX JEWISH
CONGREGATIONS OF AMERICA

UNITED SYNAGOGUE OF AMERICA

WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION
AMERICAN SECTION, INC.

ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

October 9, 1973

President Richard M. Nixon
The Whitehouse
Washington D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

As Israel battles for her very survival, she turns to her one true and steadfast friend, the United States, for urgently needed aircraft and defense material.

We appeal to you in the name of all of American Jewry to immediately provide Israel with needed aircraft replacement so that she may maintain her defense capability at the maximum level.

Mr. President, Israel turns to you. We turn to you. Your prompt action could stave off a possible tragedy of massive and historic proportions.

Your record of support for Israel's right to exist has been steadfast. The hour is critical! We are confident that you will take the necessary steps which the events of the moment call for as Israel responds to Arab aggression.

Sincerely,

Jacob Stein
Jacob Stein
Chairman, Conference of
Presidents of Major American
Jewish Organizations

David A. Blumberg
David A. Blumberg
President B'Nai B'Rith

Mrs. Max E. Markkin
Mrs. Max E. Markkin
President, Hadassah

Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg
Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg
President, American Jewish
Congress

Max M. Fisher
Max M. Fisher
Chairman, Board of
Governors Jewish Agency

Mrs. Charlotte Jacobson
Mrs. Charlotte Jacobson
Chairman, World Zionist
Organization American
Section

Rabbi Israel Miller
Rabbi Israel Miller
President, American
Zionist Federation

October 14, 1973

TELEGRAM TO THE PRESIDENT FROM JACOB STEIN AND
COLLEAGUES

The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations representing the American Jewish community supports the position of our Government in implementing the established policy of maintaining the balance of arms in the Middle East and in supplying Israel with materiel required to repel Arab aggression and to meet the challenge of the continuing massive Soviet resupply airlift.

The White House

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PMS LEONARD GARMENT

WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON DC

DEAR MR GARMENT WE HAVE TODAY DISPATCHED THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM
TO PRESIDENT NIXON AND SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER:

THE CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS
REPRESENTING THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY SUPPORTS THE POSITION
OF OUR GOVERNMENT IN IMPLEMENTING THE ESTABLISHED POLICY OF
MAINTAINING THE BALANCE OF ARMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IN SUPPLYING
ISRAEL WITH MATERIEL REQUIRED TO REPEL ARAB AGGRESSION AND TO
MEET THE CHALLENGE OF THE CONTINUING MASSIVE SOVIET RESUPPLY
AIRLIFT.

JACOB STEIN CHAIRMAN YEHUDA HELLMAN EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR /I
L KENEN, CHAIRMAN, AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE/ELMER
L WINTER, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE/RABBI ARTHUR
HERTZBERG, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS/SOL CHAIKIN,
CHAIRMAN, AMERICAN TRADE UNION COUNCIL FOR HISTADRUT/RABBI ISRAEL
MILLER, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN ZIONIST FEDERATION/SEYMOUR GRAUBARD,
PRESIDENT, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH/DAVID M BLUMBERG,
PRESIDENT, B'NAI B'RITH/MRS NATHAN HOLSTEIN, PRESIDENT, B'NAI
B'RITH WOMEN/HON. ABRAHAM J MULTER, PRESIDENT, BNAI ZION/RABBI
ROBERT I KAHN, PRESIDENT, CENTRAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN RABBIS/RAYMO
ND EPSTEIN, PRESIDENT, COUNCIL OF JEWISH FEDERATIONS AND WELFARE
FUNDS/MRS MAX MATZKIN, PRESIDENT, HADASSAH /JUDGE JACOB T ZUKERMAN,
PRESIDENT, JEWISH LABOR COMMITTEE/RABBI IRA EISENSTEIN, PRESIDENT,
JEWISH RECONSTRUCTIONIST FOUNDATION/COMM. AINSLEY FERDIE, NATIONAL

Telegram to
Pres & Sec
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for
Kissinger
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6 COMMANDER, JEWISH WAR VETERANS OF THE USA/DR. JUDAH J SHAPIRO,
7 PRESIDENT, LABOR ZIONIST ALLIANCE/DR. MAURICE SAGE, PRESIDENT,
8 MIZRACHI - HAPOEL HAMIZRACHI/MRS LOUIS J SCHREIBER, PRESIDENT,
9 MIZRACHI WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA/MRS EARL MARVIN, PRESIDENT,
10 NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH WOMEN/HERMAN ROSENBAUM, PRESIDENT,
11 NATIONAL COUNCIL OF YOUNG ISRAEL/MRS DAVID M LEVITT, PRESIDENT,
12 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF TEMPLE SISTERHOODS/LEWIS D COLE, CHAIRMAN,
13 NATIONAL JEWISH COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL/MORTON
14 L MANDEL, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL JEWISH WELFARE BOARD/JEFFREY C
15 FELDMAN, CHAIRMAN, NORTH AMERICAN JEWISH YOUTH COUNCIL/MRS ESTHER
16 P ZACKLER, PRESIDENT, PIONEER WOMEN/RABBI JUDAH NADICH, PRESIDENT,
17 RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY/RABBI LOUIS BERNSTEIN, PRESIDENT, RABBINICAL
18 COUNCIL OF AMERICA/RABBI IRWIN M BLANK, PRESIDENT, SYNAGOGUE
19 COUNCIL OF AMERICA/DR. MAURICE N EISENDRATH, PRESIDENT, UNION
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5 OF AMERICAN HEBREW CONGREGATIONS/HAROLD M JACOBS, PRESIDENT,
6 UNION OF ORTHODOX JEWISH CONGREGATIONS OF AMERICA/JACOB STEIN,
7 PRESIDENT, UNITED SYNAGOGUE OF AMERICA/MRS SELMA RAPAPORT, PRESIDENT,
8 WOMEN'S LEAGUE FOR CONSERVATIVE JUDAISM/MRS CHARLOTTE JACOBSON,
9 CHAIRMAN, WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION - AMERICAN SECTION, INC./HERMAN
10 L WEISMAN, PRESIDENT, ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA I WOULD
11 APPRECIATE IT IF YOU WOULD BRING THIS TELEGRAM TO THE ATTENTION
12 OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE. THANK YOU JACOB
13 STEIN, CHAIRMAN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 8550

ED 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR IS XF

SUBJ: MRS MEIR'S OCT 23 SPEECH--DEPARTURES FROM ORIGINAL TEXT

REF: TEL AVIV 8527

1. WE NOTE FROM FBIS THAT CAIRO RADIO AT 2115 GMT OCTOBER 23 CRITICIZED MRS MEIR FOR HAVING QUINED IN HER KNESSET SPEECH EARLIER THE SAME EVENING (REFTE) "CERTAIN INTERPRETATIONS" OF UNSC RESOLUTION 338 WHICH SHE ATTRIBUTED TO SOURCES "AT HIGHEST LEVEL"--INTERPRETATIONS WHICH CAIRO RADIO ASSERTED WERE NOT TRUE. ACCORDING TO TEXT WE RECEIVED, BROADCAST DID NOT IDENTIFY INTERPRETATIONS INVOLVED.

2. ACCORDING TO FBIS VERSION OF MRS MEIR'S SPEECH, SHE REFERRED ONLY ONCE TO "HIGHEST US SOURCES"--WHEN SHE DECLARED THAT MEANING OF REFERENCE IN RESOLUTION 338 TO NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PARTIES IS DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS OF INTEREST THAT ON BASIS OF COMPARISON OF GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE VERSION OF SPEECH (WHICH WE ARE RELIABLY INFORMED BY AS PREPARED BEFORE MRS MEIR'S DELIVERY), EMBASSY'S TAPE RECORDING OF IT, AND FBIS VERSION, IT IS CLEAR MRS MEIR AT THIS POINT DEPARTED FROM HER PREPARED TEXT. SHE DID SO BY INSERTING STATEMENT THAT THIS INTERPRETATION ABOUT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS "IS THE OFFICIAL INTERPRETATION FROM THE THE HIGHEST US SOURCES."

3. MRS MEIR MADE ANOTHER INSERTION IN HER PREPARED TEXT WHEN SHE STATED: "IT WAS MADE CLEAR TO ALL (BY GOI IN AUGUST 1970) THAT OUR FIRM STANDIS STILL MAINTAINED REGARDING THE RIGHT OF UNITING JERUSALEM AS THE CAPITAL OF ISRAEL."

4. COMMENT. MRS MEIR UNDOUBTEDLY MADE THESE INSERTIONS TO REDUCE HEAT OF ATTACK BY ISRAELI OPPOSITION ON GOI FOR ITS DECISION TO ACCEPT US-SOVIET SPONSORED RESOLUTION. IN PROCESS,

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HOWEVER, SHE MAY HAVE REDUCED GOI FLEXIBILITY ON
MODALITIES RE PEACE TALKS AND ON LANGUAGE WHICH COULD BE
READ AS BEARING ON JERUSALEM PROBLEM.
KEATING
BT

PSN:016656 PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:297/12:43Z DTG:241101Z LCT 73

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C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 3233

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: MOPS EG

SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN REACTION TO CEASEFIRE

SUMMARY: SADAT'S DECISION TO ACCEPT CEASEFIRE APPEARS TO BE
UNPOPULAR IN EGYPT. END SUMMARY.

1. GENERAL REACTION IN EGYPT TO CEASEFIRE APPEARS TO BE
NEGATIVE. AT STREET LEVEL, MANY EGYPTIANS APPEAR TO BE
CONSUMED WITH DOUBT AND SUSPICION AS TO REASONS FOR CEASEFIRE
AS LONG AS MILITARY SITUATION APPLARS TO BE GOOD. MANY BELIEVE
THAT, WHATEVER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, ISRAEL WILL NOT HONOR CEASE-
FIRE, AND DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY SADAT ACCEPTED CEASEFIRE
RESOLUTION WHICH APPEARS TO BE TO EGYPT'S DISADVANTAGE.

2. WE HAVE REPORTED DE BURCHGRAVE'S REACTION OF ARMY IN
ONE SECTOR OF FRONT. THIS MAY NOT HAVE BEEN CASE ELSEWHERE,
BUT CANNOT EXCLUDE IT. THERE HAS BEEN SOME SUGGESTION THAT OTHER
SECTORS OF EGYPTIAN MILITARY ARE NOT PLEASED BY CEASEFIRE.

3. EDUCATED EGYPTIANS ARE ALSO REPORTED (BY OTHER EMBASSIES
AND JOURNALISTS) TO BE UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT CEASEFIRE. SOME
SAY THAT CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AT THIS POINT WOULD TOTALLY
NEGATE PURPOSE OF WAR, SINCE THERE IS NO CONCRETE LINKAGE
BETWEEN CEASEFIRE AND FINAL SOLUTION WHICH WOULD RETURN TO
EGYPT ITS LANDS LOST IN 1967. IN GENERAL, THESE EGYPTIANS
DO NOT APPEAR TO BE AWARE OF EXTENT OF ISRAELI INCURSION
INTO WEST BANK OF CANAL, AND THEREFORE BASE THEIR DISSATISFAC-
TION ON AN ASSUMPTION OF EGYPTIAN MILITARY VICTORY. THIS
VIEW WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CHANGE AS AND WHEN IT BECOMES CLEAR

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

QUANDT, SALLY

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THAT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN TOLD THE TRUTH OF THE SITUATION
(MOST RECENT GUE COMMUNIQUE NOTES DETERIORATION OF MILITARY
SITUATION, BUT BLAMES IT ON MASSIVE ISRAELI CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS
DURING NIGHT OF OCTOBER 22/23), BUT WE DO NOT ESTIMATE THAT
THEIR AFFECTION FOR SADAT AND GUE WILL INCREASE.

4. IT IS DIFFICULT TO TELL WHERE THIS WILL LEAD. IT SEEMS
CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT SADAT IS FACED WITH POTENTIALLY UNSTABLE
SITUATION WHICH MAY BE TRANSLATED INTO REAL PRESSURES BOTH
ON CEASEFIRE AND ON HIS POSITION.

SMITH

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report #76

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Situation Report in the Middle East as of 1800 EST Oct. 29, 1973

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Military Situation

Both fronts remain relatively quiet. The Deputy UNTSO Commander visited Suez city this morning and reported that 250 Finnish UNEF troops had arrived there. He said that while the city remains in Egyptian hands and is connected to a strip of land on the east bank of the Canal held by the Egyptians, the Israelis would be able to take the city at any time should the ceasefire break down. The city has water for about 36 hours, and each side accuses the other of responsibility for cutting the city's supply. Only 24 of the 100 emergency supply trucks had entered the city and been off-loaded by noon today. Israeli spokesman Haim Herzog told newsmen that Israeli forces had already effectively cut the city off before the ceasefire resolution was passed. Israel is meanwhile pressing the UNTSO to demarcate the ceasefire line on Mount Hermon. UNTSO is holding off in the belief that this area was taken by the Israelis after the first ceasefire. The Iraqis have now publicly announced they are withdrawing their forces from Syria.

UNEF/UNTSO

The UN Secretariat has asked informally whether the US can airlift 500-600 Finnish troops from Helsinki to Cairo. An advance contingent of 50 men with accompanying equipment and two jeeps would leave November 1, the remainder November 3. The Finns have reportedly indicated great concern to the UN Secretariat that the airlift not be carried out by the USSR. We are informing the Secretariat the US can meet its request.

The SYG has not yet indicated whom he will select as elements of the UNEF. We understand, however, that the UN Secretariat is focussing on Austria, Sweden, and Ireland, (who have already lent contingents from UNFICYP) and Finland, Nepal, Panama, and Ghana. To our knowledge the question of Warsaw Pact participation has not been resolved.

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POW's

Press reports emanating from Tel Aviv indicate mounting Israeli public reaction against Israel's acceptance of a ceasefire without a settlement of the POW question. At the insistence of right-wing political parties, the Knesset will debate the question of POW's October 30 in an attempt to bind Mrs. Meir to Israel's stated position that an effective ceasefire cannot exist without a POW exchange. The press claims a senior IDF officer called for the exchange of an estimated 350 Israeli POW's held in Egypt in return for the nearly 7,000 Egyptian POW's.

Israeli Ambassador Kidron is arriving in Geneva October 29 to meet with the ICRC on the prisoner question. The ICRC believes the Arabs must promptly give Israel a list of POW's and Israel must allow for the passage of medical supplies and evacuation of wounded from the isolated positions of the Egyptian Third Army. The Vatican is considering putting pressure on the Arabs to be more forthcoming on POW exchange.

Israeli Political Pressure

In addition to popular pressure over POW exchanges, the Israeli media has been questioning Israel's decision to permit an emergency supply convoy to reach the Egyptian Third Army. Answering questions on this decision, Israeli spokesman Haim Herzog indicated that Israel was responding to American pressure. He added: "I believe that the Americans did this in order to prove to the Egyptians that they can deliver the goods which the Russians cannot do." Herzog said that the American Government has to understand that Israel is a democracy dependent on public opinion and concluded: "The United States will not be doing a service to the cause which she has espoused if she forces the hand of the Israeli Government to too great a degree." The Embassy in Tel Aviv reported speculation from various private sources that the GOI had in fact fanned the flames of public opinion over the past two days to put pressure on the U.S. to start producing in Cairo.

Egyptian Political Activity

The press continues to report that Egypt is proposing a peace plan based on: a) Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 lines; b) stationing UN Forces at Sharm el-Sheik and on Israeli and Egyptian sides of the border; c) opening the Suez Canal to

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all merchant ships including Israeli, d) creating a Palestinian State from the Jordanian West Bank and Gaza Strip, and e) internationalization of Jerusalem. The press further speculates that President Sadat's special envoy to Washington, Ismail Fahmi, will carry a letter to President Nixon.

U.S. Naval Movement

A task force composed of an aircraft carrier and a squadron of five destroyers plus auxiliary vessels from the 7th Fleet has been ordered to steam to the Indian Ocean and take up a station in the same position as did fleet units during the Bangladesh crisis. Elements of the unit sailed through the Straits of Malacca this morning. The task force should reach its destination in about four days.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OPERATIONS SECTION
APPROVED BY: <i>Roderick M. Wright</i>
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

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Lebanon/Israel

No fedayeen incidents reported. Lebanon has introduced a resolution at the ITU plenipotentiary conference at Torremolinos condemning Israel for sabotaging two submarine cables from Beirut to Europe and Cairo and calling on Israel's expulsion from the ITU in the event of any repetition of such acts.

Arab Foreign and Defense Minister's Conference

Cairo's MENA reports that 12 Arab states have now agreed to Morocco's proposal to hold a conference of Arab Foreign and Defense Ministers. The Arab league is to discuss on October 30 the venue and date of conference.

Arab and Soviet Press Coverage

Press reports from Cairo and Beirut are playing up reported American actions to promote a peace settlement. All three major Cairo dailies reported President Nixon as saying that the chances for a permanent peace are better now than they have been for 20 years. They also carried an Israeli report that the US is calling for Israel to withdraw immediately to the October 22 cease-fire line. Beirut's respected an-Nahar carried a story on October 29 that the US has assured Egypt of an Israeli withdrawal from all of Sinai before the start of enlarged Middle East Peace talks. However, the Arab press has been giving heavy play to a Heikal story accusing the US of helping Israel cross the Suez Canal by providing photos of the area between the Egyptian Second and Third Armies taken during two reconnaissance flights on October 13.

The Soviet press has pictured the outcome of the last week's crisis in its relations with the United States as a victory for Moscow's "coolness and calm" over American "adventurism."

Gabon to Break with Israel

The only country left in Central Africa having relations with Israel, Gabon, plans to break them. The only one in West Africa still having relations with Israel, the Ivory Coast, may follow suit. *Kenya is about the only other left.*

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Oil

During Ambassador Akin's introductory call on Saudi Foreign Minister Sagqaf, Sagqaf said the US must understand that good bilateral relations can never be fully restored until a just solution to the Middle East problem has been reached, and that Saudi Arabia stands firm in its resolution to use oil as a political weapon on the Arab side. The Middle East Economicsurvey of October 26 estimates that Arab oil production has been cut 20 percent since September 1973, or by 4.1 million barrels per day, as follows:

<u>Country</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>Est. Present Production</u>	<u>Cutback</u>
Saudi Arabia	8,300	6,500	1,800
Kuwait	3,200	2,340	860
Iraq	2,000	1,500	500
Abu Dhabi	1,400	1,220	180
Qatar	582	462	120
Neutral Zone	582	524	58
Libya	2,300	2,100	200
Algeria	1,050	900	150
Others	1,050	800	250
(Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, Dubai, and Oman)			
Total	20,464	16,346	4,118

Arab Pressure on Japan

In response to Arab pressure, a Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman denied in a press conference on October 29 that there was any basis for a BBC story that the US was resupplying Israel from bases in Japan and Guam.

Resupply

A special DOD team departed the U.S. for Israel October 29 to validate logistic losses and estimate Israeli repair and replacement capabilities as well as Arab losses. The team, which is instructed to make an on-site assessment of Israeli losses, is due back in about two weeks.

APPROVED BY: *[Signature]*

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

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War

SAUNDERS 5848

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 29, 1973

Dear Mr. President:

Your message of October 20 outlining Romania's views on the situation in the Middle East is appreciated. From the outset of hostilities, American efforts have been directed toward two objectives: to end the fighting and to create conditions which would contribute to a lasting peace.


As the result of intensive efforts by the United States, together with those of other countries, the United Nations Security Council was able in the early hours of October 22 to adopt a most important resolution on the Middle East. This resolution calls not only for a cease-fire, but also for implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts and negotiations between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace. In brief, it provides the framework required to bring peace to the Middle East.

The United States fully supports the principles embodied in this resolution, and we will devote our continuing efforts to assist in their effective implementation. If this resolution is to succeed, it will need the support of all interested parties, and it is my hope that the Government of Romania will also devote its earnest efforts to ensuring the resolution's success.


I express this hope to you, Mr. President, in the frank and cordial spirit which has come to characterize our

communications. I will look forward to reviewing this extremely important subject in greater detail at the time of your forthcoming visit.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Richard Nixon", written in a cursive style.

His Excellency
Nicolae Ceausescu
President of the Council of State
of the Socialist Republic of Romania
Bucharest



Department of State

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PBOB, MOPS, XF, NATO
SUBJ: COUNCIL AND MIDDLE EAST

REF: (A) USNATO 5179
(B) USNATO 5184

1. YOUR NON-DEFENSIVE STANCE ADOPTED IN DISCUSSION IN
COUNCIL AND PERMREP LUNCH IS CORRECT POSTURE. IN FUTURE
DISCUSSION YOU SHOULD DRAW ON FOLLOWING:

1. ALLIES FAIL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN TWO
SEPARATE ISSUES: ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM PER SE AND
SOVIET INTERVENTION IN MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT.
WE RECOGNIZE THAT MANY IF NOT MOST OF OUR NATO
ALLIES PURSUE POLICY WITH REGARD TO ARAB-ISRAELI
ISSUE DIFFERENT FROM THAT PURSUED BY US, IF NOT
IN OBJECTIVES AT LEAST IN TACTICS. WE NOT ASKING
ALLIES TO ENDORSE OUR POLICY ON THIS ISSUE BUT
EXPECT THEM TO UNDERSTAND OUR POSITION. SOVIET
INTERVENTION HOWEVER IS DIFFERENT ISSUE

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WHICH THREATENED TO RADICALIZE THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HARM LONG-TERM WESTERN, INCLUDING NATO, INTERESTS. US RESUPPLY OF ISRAELI WAS TO THWART VICTORY BY THOSE SUPPORTED BY SOVIETS AND ACHIEVE SITUATION (AS AT PRESENT) WHERE BASIS MIGHT


BE ESTABLISHED FOR NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE. THIS LATTER OBJECTIVE WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE WELCOMED BY OUR ALLIES.

2. THE "MILITARY ALERT" MEASURES OF OCTOBER 25, WHICH ACTUALLY INVOLVED INCREASED READINESS, WERE DIRECTED TO END OF THWARTING SOVIET DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN AREA WITH ALL THE DESTABILIZING EFFECTS SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD HAVE NOT ONLY FOR MIDDLE EAST BUT ALSO FOR EUROPE.

3. WE RECOGNIZE MIDDLE EAST ITSELF NOT PART OF NATO TREATY AREA BUT WE FAIL TO SEE HOW OUR ALLIES CAN BLIND THEMSELVES TO EVENTS IN A CONTIGUOUS AREA, WHEN THEY THREATENED TO WASH OVER INTO THE EUROPEAN AREA GENERALLY, PARTICULARLY WHEN ISSUE IS ONE OF MASSIVE SOVIET SUPPORT FOR ONE SIDE OR EVEN OF A DIRECT SOVIET PRESENCE.

4. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS MUST HAVE MADE THEIR OWN ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN MIDDLE EAST. THESE ASSESSMENTS DOUBTLESS PARALLELED OURS AND WE REGRET THAT THEY DID NOT LEAD TO GREATER ALLIED SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORTS. FAILURE TO SUPPORT OUR EFFORTS GENERALLY AND DIPLOMATICALLY AND THE POSITION OF MANY ALLIES ON OVERFLIGHT AND LANDING RIGHTS FOR RESUPPLY MISSIONS COMMUNICATED EITHER EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY COMPLICATED OUR TASK, AND LED TO EXPRESSIONS OF US CONCERN VOICED IN RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT OUR ALLIES DISTANCING THEMSELVES FROM US.

5. AS TO CONTACTS WITH INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, IT IS DIFFICULT TO ADVISE ALLIES COLLECTIVELY OF EVERY TURN IN THESE FAST-MOVING CONTACTS BUT THE FACT OF THESE CONTACTS WAS KNOWN. WE



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BELIEVE THAT ALLIES KEPT REASONABLY WELL INFORMED ON THESE CONTACTS, WHICH DIRECTED TOWARDS ACHIEVING A CEASEFIRE, LAYING BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON A FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT AND THAT THEY WOULD HAVE GAINED LITTLE FROM MORE DETAILED BRIEFING. MOREOVER, WE MAINTAINED FREQUENT CONTACT WITH THOSE ALLIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN UN DELIBERATIONS AND ACTIONS. ON "ALERT" SITUATION, THIS HAPPENED SUDDENLY WITH SUBMISSION OF A SOVIET COMMUNICATION ON NIGHT OF OCTOBER 24 IN RESPONSE TO WHICH US FELT IT MUST ACT PROMPTLY AND DECISIVELY. IT WAS A SITUATION IN WHICH TIME DID NOT PERMIT THE ADVANCE CONSULTATION WE NORMALLY DESIRE. YOU SHOULD ALSO RECALL YOUR COMMUNICATION TO COUNCIL ON INSTRUCTIONS ON OCTOBER 25 ON THE ALERT. (THE SECRETARY'S OCTOBER 25 PRESS CONFERENCE PROVIDES NECESSARY BACKGROUND ON THIS ASPECT. YOU MAY ALSO DRAW ON PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE OF OCTOBER 26.)

6. WE AWARE THAT EXTENT OF CONSULTATION WAS NOT WHAT WE MIGHT HAVE LIKED AND WILL SEEK TO TAKE STEPS TO ASSURE THAT IN THE EVOLVING SITUATION CONSULTATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE. AS A START TO THIS END, THE SECRETARY HAS INSTRUCTED THAT AS NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST DEVELOP, A MEANS BE FOUND TO INFORM OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES MORE SWIFTLY AND COMPLETELY.

7. WE SHOULD ALL RECOGNIZE THAT STRAINS ON OUR ALLIANCE ARE OF BENEFIT TO NONE BUT OUR ADVERSARIES. THE TIME HAS COME TO CLOSE RANKS, AND ASSIST IN ATTAINING A LASTING SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

8. WE INTEND TO INTENSIFY OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES.

9. IF QUESTIONS RAISED CONCERNING SECDEF'S PUBLIC COMMENTS REGARDING MILITARY AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF ALLIES CONDUCT IN THIS CRISIS, YOU SHOULD NOTE THEM AND REPORT. KISSINGER

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BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 8730

CONTROL: 8 3 9 4 Q
OCTOBER 29, 1973
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E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, US
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH MRS MEIR ON OCT 24

REF: TEL AVIV 8575

1. IN REFTTEL, I REPORTED MRS MEIR'S CONVERSATION WITH ME ON OCTOBER 24. THE CENTRAL THEME OF HER REMARKS WAS THAT SHE AND GOI HAD GIVEN THEIR WORD THAT ISRAEL ACCEPTED RESOLUTION 338 AND CEASEFIRE, AND WOULD NOT VIOLATE THIS PLEDGE BY TAKING INITIATIVE TO BREAK CEASEFIRE ON SOUTHERN SUEZ FRONT. SHE SEEMED GREATLY DISTURBED THAT PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY MIGHT DOUBT HER BONA FIDES. THAT SEEMED TO BE HER MAIN PURPOSE IN SENDING FOR ME. ALTHOUGH I PERSONALLY BELIEVED HER, I REALIZE MY SIGHTS ARE LIMITED AND VALID INFORMATION MAY BE AVAILABLE TO WASHINGTON OF WHICH I AM UNAWARE. I TOLD HER I WOULD REPORT HER CONCERNS AT ONCE.

2. I RECOMMENDED THAT MRS MEIR BE REASSURED THAT US "DOES NOT QUESTION HER VERACITY OR FRIENDSHIP FOR U.S.." THAT OR THE OPPOSITE MAY HAVE BEEN DONE DIRECTLY, BUT I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY DECISION, POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, AS CONCERNS THIS RECOMMENDATION. INDEED YOU MAY VERY WELL DISAGREE WITH IT FRANKLY, I HAVE MORE DOUBT REGARDING ITS VALIDITY THAN WHEN I MADE IT.

3. I BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, THAT I BE INFORMED AS TO THE DEPT'S REACTION TO MRS MEIR'S STATEMENTS AND TO MY RECOMMENDATION AS WELL AS DECISION AS TO ACTION TAKEN OR NOT TAKEN. WITHOUT THIS INFORMATION, IT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR ME TO JUDGE WITH CONFIDENCE THE CREDIBILITY OF SENIOR GOI OFFICIALS IN MY FUTURE DEALINGS WITH THEM ON IMPORTANT ISSUES. ALSO, UNLESS SHE HAS HEARD DIRECTLY, I FEAR PRIME MINISTER MAY SUMMON ME AGAIN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

-2-TEL AVIV 8730, OCTOBER 29, 1973 (NODIS)

TO PROBE AS TO MY READING OF ATTITUDES IN WASHINGTON.
IN THIS RESPECT THE LAST FORTY-EIGHT HOURS HAVE WITNESSED
A MARKED INCREASE AMONG GENERAL PUBLIC AND PRESS IN
NERVOUSNESS OVER TREND IN ISRAELI-U.S. RELATIONSHIPS,
PARTICULARLY AS CONCERNS DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN SUEZ
FRONT (WE ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY ON THIS SUBJECT).

KEATING

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